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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Mr. Tortolano's successive 
petition's for post-conviction relief (hereinafter referred to second and third 
petitions) and judgments (#41551, R., pp.109-110; pp. 120-121; #41552 R., pp. 34-
35; p.45.) The order of dismissal of the third petition should be reversed becuase 
the district court wrongly applied the respondent's motion for summary dismissal 
of Tortolano's third petition, the respondent failed to file an Answer setting 
any affirmative defenses, when the petition raised a genuine issue of material 
fact - specifically newly discovered evidence showing prosecutorial misconduct 
that was just discovered by Tortolano due to a prosecution witness coming forward 
with information that Tortolano had no knowledge to until know. 
B. General Course of Proceedings in this and Related Cases 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
In October 2002, Mr. Tortolano was charged with Murder in the Second Degree. 
Tortolano entered a plea of not guilty and was afforded the right to a jury trial 
that began in April 2003. On May 9, 2003 the jury returned a verdict of guilty 
for Murder in the Second Degree. Tortolano was sentenced in August 2003 and the 
judgment of conviction was filed in the court record on September 4, 2003. Mr. 
Tortolano then sought a reduction of his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35, which 
was denied. Tortolano also filed an appeal from his conviction to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, S.Ct. No. 30089, which the Court affirmed the criminal conviction 
in an opinion dated June 12, 2006. The Remittitur for the appeal was filed 
December 15, 2006. 
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2. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 
On August 14, 2007, Mr. Tortolano filed a post-conviction relief alleging, 
among other things, ineffective assistance of trial counsel in Ada County case 
CV-PC-2007-14552. In October 2009, the district court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on the allegations raised by Tortolano and both the Petitioner and 
Respondent were afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of his 
claims. On November 7, 2008 the district court entered an order denying Tortolano's 
petition and dismissing the petition. Tortolano filed an appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, S.Ct. No. 35987. The Idaho Court of Appeals on July 26, 2010, 
issued its 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 563, affirming the district courts 
judgment denying post-conviction relief. Tortolano sought a Petition for Rehearing 
which was denied, then sought a Petition for Review with the Idaho Supreme Court 
which was denied on September 28, 2010, a Remittitur was issued on October 4, 
2010. 
On June 28, 2012, Mr. Tortolano filed a second petition for post-conviction 
relief - almost 18 months after the remittiture finally determining his apepal 
from his first petition was finalized accompanied with several several Affidavits 
that were attached as Exhibits. (#41551, R.,pp.5-18.) Tortolano alleged five claims 
pertaining to trial counsel's ineffectiveness (#41551, R., p.8) and three claims 
of first post-conviction relief counsel being ineffective (#41551, R., pp.8-9.) 
Additionally Tortolano submitted an amended petition which supplemented additional 
claims against trial counsel and first post-conviction relief counsel (#41551, 
R., pp.46-48.) Tortolano also submitted a Motion and Affidavit for Appointment 
of Counsel which the district court granted (#41551, R., pp.27-32) and a 
Substitution of Conflict Counsel was filed (#41551, R., pp.35-36.) 
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On October 17, 2012 Respondent filed an Answer to Tortolano's second petition 
setting forth the affirmative defenses that it was a successive petition and barred 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4908(a). (#41551, R., pp.51-52) and also submitted 
its Answer to the Amended Petition (#41551, R., pp.54-55) asserting the same 
affirmative defense as the previous one. 
On November 20, 2012, Tortolano's counsel and counsel for respondent met with 
the district court in a status conference hearing in where Tortolano's counsel 
requested thirty (30) days to file a Second Amended Petition if necessary, which 
the district court granted, giving Tortolano's counsel until December 20, 2012 
to file a second amended petition (#41551, R., pp.59-60.) Over a four (4) month 
period from the time the district court granted Tortolano's counsel to file a 
second amended petition, counsel for Tortolano filed three motions to extend the 
time for filing the second amended petition, which respondent stipulated to and 
the district court granted #(41551, R., pp.61-73.) On June 7, 2013 counsel for 
Tortolano filed a notice of non-filing of amended petition for post-conviction 
relief informing the respondent and the district court that he would not be filing 
a second amended petition but rather proceed forward with the second petition that 
was filed on June 28, 2012 (#41551, R., pp.74-75.) 
On July 3, 2013, counsel for respondent filed its Memorandum In Support of 
Motion for Summary Disposition of Second Successive Petition and/or Motion to 
Dismiss (#41551, R., pp.77-99) in where four (4) issues were presented as to why 
the matter should be dismissed (#41551, R., p.79.) A Notice of Hearing was filed 
by respondent on July 16, 2013 setting the matter of the motion for summary 
disposition of the second petition and/or motion to dismiss for September 4, 2013. 
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In the meantime, Mr. Tortolano filed a thrid "Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief" with the district court setting forth a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim in that trial attorneys failed to challenge the 
prosecutor's opening statement to the jury in that a witness Fred Latham would 
be called to provide incriminating testimony that Tortolano was planing on killing 
the victim. Tortolano based this claim upon newly discovered evidence and provided 
a Affidavit that Mr. Latham had signed July 26, 2013, with the filing of the thrid 
petition taking place 12 days after the newly discovered evidence was obtained. 
(#41552, R., pp.3-11.) 
In conjunction with filing of the Third Petition, Tortolano also requested 
the court to appoint counsel by submitting a Motion and Affidavit in Support for 
Appointment of Counsel (#41552, R., pp.20-22) in which the district court granted 
by appinting the Ada County Public Defender or Conflict Counsel (#41552, R., p.24.) 
Randall S. Barnum, Counsel in Tortolano's second petition that was also pending 
before the district court filed a Substitution of Counsel in the matter (#41552, 
R., pp.30-31.) 
Respondent, rather than filing an Answer to the Thrid Petition, filed a Motion 
for Summary Dismissal of Third Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
(#41552, R. pp.25-27) requesting that it be dismissed due to the pending second 
petition, and that it is nothing more than an inappropriate attempt to file 
additinal motions relating to the second pending petition before the district 
court prose and without advise of counsel and lastly that it was beyond the 
scope of I.C. 19-4901, et. al. with the district court lacking the authority to 
hear/adjudicate the claim set forth in the third petition (#41552, R., pp.25-26.) 
5 
Respondent also filed a Notice of Hearing setting forth September 4, 2013 
for the Motion to Dismiss (#41552, R., p.28) and then again a second notice 
was filed setting the matter for October 15, 2014, in where the respondents motions 
to dismiss both the second and third petitions would be heard (#41552, R., p.34.) 
Mr. Tortolano, through counsel submitted an Affidavit in support of his second 
petition for post-conviction relief setting to support the Claims he had set forth 
in his Second Petition prior to the October 15th hearing that was set before the 
district corut (#41551, R., pp.102-108.) 
A hearing for the respondent's two motions to dismiss was taken up before 
the district court on October 15, 2013, in where the respondent presented argument 
in respects to the second post-conviction petition that it was untimely and should 
be dismissed (#41551, Tr., pp.4-12, Ln.1-25, 1-16) and then with respects to the 
third petition for post-conviction relief as well (#41552, Tr., pp.12-14, Ln. 1-
25, 1-13.) 
The district court then gave Mr. Tortolano's counsel an opportunity to be 
heard in respects to both the second and third petitions. (#41551, #41552, Tr., 
p.14, Ln.14-15.) In respects to the second petition, Tortolano's counsel, had 
had agreed "that there's not a specific indication as to the lapse of time between 
the remittitur on the last last post-conviction and the filing of the second 
petition for post-conviction relief". (#41551, Tr., p.16, Ln.17-21.) 
As to Tortolano's third petition which contained newly discovered evidence 
Counsel for Tortolano argued that the context of the affidavit of Fred Latham it 
was fair to conclude that it was newly discovered evidence based on fact, opposed 
to law. (#41552, Tr., pp.15-16, Ln.1-25, 1-4) and in addition that the burden 
was upon the respondent to prove that it was not newly discovered evidence. (#41552, 
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Tr., p.17, Ln.16-17.) 
The district court after hearing arguments in respects to the second and third 
petitions for post-conviction relief determined in respects to the second petition 
that it seemed to do nothing more than seek to relitigate issues that either were 
or should have been fully litigated during the hearing on his first post-conviction 
petition, and granted the states motion to dismiss. (#41551, Tr., pp.17-18, Ln., 
22-25; R., pp.109-110.) 
In respects to Tortolano's third petition, the district court having determined 
the contention that there is newly discovered evidence, and having appeared if 
that were evidence that would support relief under the post-conviction relief 
statute, it is not newly discovered evidence that would make out a claim that would 
entitle Tortolano any relief, and the second successive petition for post-conviction 
relief was similarly dismissed summarily on the respondents motion to dismiss. 
#41552, Tr., pp.18-19, Ln.12-25, 1-3; R., pp.34-35.) 
These two appeals followed. (#41551, R., pp.111-115; #41552, R., pp.36-40.) 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court exercised an abuse of discretion in dismissing 
the Second Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief when its issues were 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
State and Federal Law, as determined by the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Court of the United States: 
A. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing 
Tortolano's Second Successive Petition which was not pursuant to a 
clear, consistently applied well-established state procedural rule. 
B. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing 
Tortolano's newly discovered evidence claim without an evidentiary 
hearing for it raised a genuine issue of material facts regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct,and ineffective of assistance of trial 
counsel. 
C. Tortolano was deprived of effective assistance of counsel on collateral 
review of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claim presented 
in the second successive petition for post-conviction relief that was 




A. Standard of Review 
An application for post-conviction relief under I.C. §19-4901 is civil in 
nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action 
which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App.1984). In 
order to prevail in a post conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove by 
perponderance of the evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. Id. 
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under 
I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 
(Ct. App.1991). Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed true 
for the purposes of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be held. 
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 84 (Ct. App.1994). If the allegations do not frame 
a genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily 
dismiss, but if the application raises a material fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. 
After summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, the 
reviewing court exercises free and independent review of the district court's 
application of law, including constitutional issues. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 






B. Did the district court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing 
Tortolano's Second Successive Petition which was not pursuant to a 
clear, consistently applied well-established rule. 
1. Facts pertaining to argument 
On August 8, 2013, Mr. Tortolano filed a verified prose petition for post-
conviction relief setting forth two claims for relief, ineffective assistance of 
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, both related to newly discovered factual 
evidence offered by affidavit from a prosecution witness. (#41552, R., pp. 3-11.) 
This exhibit, an Affidavit of Fred Lathum, presented newly discovered evidence 
with respect to facts that Tortolano did not have an opportunity to otherwise 
learn of these particular facts other than speaking with Mr. Latham years after 
the trial had taken place. 
The respondent had moved for summary dismissal on August 20, 2013, on lieu 
of filing an Answer pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(a). (#41552, pp. 25-26.) Respondent 
asserted in the motion that Tortolano was attempting to do nothing more than 
attempt to file additional motions relating to a previous successive petition for 
post-conviction relief that was currently pending before the district court for 
its consideration. (See, #41551, sic passim.) 
The district court on August 11, 2013, having determined that Tortolano had 
set forth claims for post-conviction which a reasonable person would pursue 
appointed counsel to represent him (#41552, R., p. 24) with a substitution of 
counsel being filed by conflict attorney assigned to the case who subsequently 
was already representing Tortolano in the first successive petition. (#41552, R., 
p. 30-31.) 
Respondent on September 4, 2014, field a Notice of Hearing setting the matters 
pending in the second successive petition for October 15, 2013, which was also 
10 
which was also the same date for a hearing on the motion to dismiss respondent 
had filed in the first successive petition (#41551, R., pp.107-108.) 
The district court on October 15, 201J, held a hearing on respondents' 
motion to dismiss for both successive petitions. Respondent in respects to the 
second successive petition presented oral argument without making any submissions 
of the underlying criminal records in the matter concerning the newly discovered 
evidence that Tortolano had presented regarding Fred Latham's Affidavit he had 
submitted as part of his second successive petition. Tortolano's counsel argued 
that it was newly discovered evidence and also pointed out the burden remains 
upon the respondent to disprove the facts and evidence presented. (#41552, Tr., 
pp. 12-17, Ln., 17-25, 1-21.) 
The district court having heard arguments on the matter ruled that the 
newly discovered evidence, if it were evidence that would support relief under 
the post-conviction relief statute, is not newly discovered evidence and would 
not make out a clam that would entitled Tortolano to relief, and issued an Order 
of Dismissal of Petitioners' Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (#41552, Tr., 
pp. 17-19, Ln., 22-25, 1-11; R., pp. 34-35.) 
2. Why relief should be granted 
Mr. Tortolano presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding newly 
discovered evidence that demonstrated ineffective assistance of trial counsel and 
prosecutorial misconduct. (#41552, R., pp. 8-11.) 
Upon respondent receiving the second successive petition was required by 
statute, I.C. § 19-4906(a), and Rule 8, I.R.C.P., to file an Answer to Tortolano's 
petition within "30 days after the docketing of the application, ••• respond by 
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answer or by motion which may be supported by affidavits." I.C. 19-4906(a). 
In addition to following the mandates of I.C. 19-4906(a), respondent in its answer 
or motion under Rule 8(c), IRCP, was required to set forth its affirmative 
defenses. 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, and within it 
boot-strapped it to the proceedings in the first successive petition when it 
was required under Rule 8(c) to set forth its affirmative defenses. Here, the 
respondent failed to do this. 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(a) provides that if the record of the underlying 
criminal case is not filed with the petition, that the respondent is required 
to file the record -- or such relevant portions of the record -- with the court 
with Respondent's Answer. See: Roman v. State, 873 P.2d 898, 902 n.3 (Ct.App. 
1994). Respondent has provided neither portions of or the entire underlying 
criminal record nor an Answer and therefore have failed to comply with the 
mandates of I.C. 19-4906(a) and Rule 8(c) regarding any affirmative defense that 
may have been presented. 
Here, in the hearing that the district court conducted regarding the 
motion to dismiss, counsel for respondent avered to the fact that the statements 
made by Mr. Lathem were not true and that she "had to go back and refresh [her] 
recollection." (#41522, Tr., pp. 12-13, Ln.21-25, 1-5.) Since the respondent 
submitted no evidence to controvert Tortolano's factual assertions that were 
set froth in the second successive petition (#41552, R., pp.3-11), the facts are 
undisputed. The district court's summary dismissal order was predicated upon 
its conclusion that Tortolano' s claims were not newly discovered. , _: _ . __ _ 
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Mr. Tortolano presented newly discovered evidence in which the respondent 
failed to support its motion to dismiss with portions, or the entire, underlying 
criminal record, in order to permit Tortolano a full and fair opportunity to 
respond properly to the motion to dismiss. Nor was a properly filed Answer done 
in accordance with I.C. 19-4906(a). Since the respondent submitted no evidence 
to controvert Tortolano's factual assertions, the facts are undisputed. In 
evaluating post-conviction claims for summary dismissal, this court assumes the 
truth of the applicant's allegations of fact. Martinez v. State, 944 P.2d 127, 
139-40 (Ct.App. 1997); Martinez v. Klauser, 266 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2001) in 
where the Ninth Circuit held that the dismissal of the petition was not pursuant 
to a clear, consistently applied, and well-established state procedural rule. 
Mr. Tortolano presented newly discovered evidence in his petition which 
shifted the burden of proof to the respondent who in turn failed to follow proper 
procedures in setting forth an affirmative defense by submitting portions of the 
underlying criminal record to support the dismiss. As such, the district court 
erred in dismissing the petition and the Order must be vacated with remand and 
instructions to remedy the error. 
For the reasons set forth above it is requested the Court reverse the district 
court's order of dismissal of the second successive petition for post-conviction 






C. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing 
Tortolano's newly discovered evidence claims without an evidentiary 
hearing for it raised a genuine issue of material facts regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
1. Facts pertaining to argument 
It was alleged in the second successive petition for post-conviction petition, 
with an Affidavit of Fred Latham, to support his claims that prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred when the prosecution made in its opening statement to the jury 
that they would hear testimony from Mr. Latham that Mr. Tortolano had told 
Latham the he was planning on killing Penny and that trial attorney's failed to 
challenge the respondents statement. (#41552, R., pp. 5-6; 8-11.) 
The remainder of the facts pertaining to this issue are incorporated herein 
from the previous issue, "B. 1. Facts pertaining to argument" as if restated in 
its entirety. 
2. Why relief should be granted 
The district court incorrectly applied the law in granting respondents motion 
to dismiss by stating that it was not newly discovered evidence that would make 
out a claim that would entitle him to relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Relief Act ("UPCPA") and is contrary to well related cases that derive the 
newly discovered exception and discovery exception from the language of Idaho 
Code 19-4908, which is incorrect. The proper analysis for the court would have 
been to conclude the "discovery exception" is correctly applicable under Idaho 
Code 19-4902 when considering "newly discovered evidence" concerning Brady claims. 
a. Idaho's UPCPA is a unitary act that must be construed as a whole 
The proper use of Idaho's UPCPA is to protect the petitioner's constitutional 
rights. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). The UPCPA 
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is a unitary body of laws governing the procedure and manner in which a person 
may seek relief after a conviction has been entered. Ibid. As such, the limitation 
period set forth in Idaho Code Section 19-4902 controls, whether the petitioner 
is filing a first petition or a successive petition thereto. 
A court must construe a statute as a whole and consider all sections of the 
applicable statue together to determine the intent of the legislature. Herman v. 
Blaine County Bd. of Com'rs Acting as Blain County Bd. of Equalization, 126 Idaho 
970, 971, 895 P.2d 571, 572 (1995) (citing Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 
Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994)). A construing court's primary duty 
is to give effect to the legislative intent and the policy and purpose underlying 
statute. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336-37, 870 P.2d 1295-96. It is incumbent that upon 
the court to give the statute an interpretation that will not deprive it of its 
potency. Id. 
b. The I.C. §19-4902 statue of limitations applies to legitimate Brady 
claims running from the date of discovery of the Brady violation 
Idaho Code 19-4902 permits consideration of a successive petition for post-
conviction relief where the court "finds a ground for relief asserted in a 
successive application which for sufficient reason was asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplmental, or amended application. While 
the Idaho Supreme Court held in Evensiosky v. State, 136, Idaho 189, 191, 30 
P.3d 967, 969 (2001) that there is no discovery exception to Idaho Code 19-4902, 
and actual Brady violation would constitute an exception to this rule, creating 
a basis for equitable tolling of the UPCPA's one-year limitation period until 
such the Brady vioation is discoverd. 
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An actual Brady violation itself, by virtue of the state's misconduct, 
equitably tolls the UPCPA's one year statute of limitation. Freshwater v. State, 
160 S.W. 3d 548, 550 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2005) ("due process requires the tolling to 
the statute of limitations for filing the petition for [post-conviction relief] 
with respect to the petitioner's claim of previously withheld exculpatory 
evidence"). The one-year statute of limitation, I.C. § 19-4902, runs from the 
moment the Brady vioation is discovered. 
c. In This Post-Conviction Case, Tortolano Has Met His Burden Of Establishing 
A Prima Facie Case Of A Violation Under Brady v. Maryland among others 
The district court in its order granting the state's motion for summary 
dismissal incorrectly held that Tortolano had not raised an issue which would 
entitle him to relief and found the second successive petition failed to 
demonstrate a reasonable or sufficient basis for not having raised or addressed 
the matter in a prior post-conviction relief. (#41552, R., p.34.) However, in 
support of his claims, Tortolano submitted an Affidavit of Fred Latham (#41552, 
R., pp.8-11) demonstrating newly discovered evidence that goes to facts which he 
did not have opportunity to otherwise learn of these particular facts other than 
speaking with Mr. Latham, which counsel for Tortolano went so far as to properly 
address the matter was timely, and based his argument on the Idaho Supreme Court's 
holdings in Charboneau, v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2008). (#41552, 
Tr., p.15, Ln.12-22.) 
Charboneau was a successive petition for post-conviction relief, but one of 
the underlying issues in that ruling was regarding the timeliness of a petition 
being filed upon the state's misconduct where a Brady violation is asserted. Id. 
114 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. Therein, Charboneau failed to demonstrate that 
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he had failed to file his petition within a reasonable time, as he filed it thirteen 
months after his awareness of undisclosed evidence. Id. 114 Idaho at 905, 174 
P.3d 875. The circumstances in Mr. Tortolano's case provide stark contrast to the 
occurrence in Charboneau. Tortolano filed his petition eleven (11) days after 
learning of the evidence, and furthermore, he supported his filing with material 
facts which were admissible material evidence and clearly demonstrated that this 
was newly discovered evidence. (#41552, R., pp.8-11.) 
i. Tortolano Has Made A Showing, Through Admissible Evidence, That 
The Withheld Testimony Was Exculpatory and Impeaching 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the United States Supreme 
Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either 
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court clarified that "impeachment evidence ••• as well as exculpatory 
evidence, falls within the Brady rule." The Supreme Court also clearly abandoned 
the practice that a different standard of law should be applied depending upon 
whether the defense had requested the information. Id. at 683 (disavowing 
distinctions stated in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
The Bagley decision also clarified that "evidence is material only if there 
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682. In other 
words, a "'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. 
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In Kyles v. Wihitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), the United States Supreme 
Court held that impeachment evidence known only to the police but unknown to the 
prosecutor was subject to Brady disclosure. The Kyles Court also emphasized that 
the Bagley materiality test requires the court to consider the suppressed evidence 
"collectively, not item by item." Id. at 436. Particularly, the Kyles Court 
explained: 
[Courts] soould evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed 
evidence item by item; there is no other way. We evaluate its cum.ilative effect 
for purpcse of IIBteriality seµrrately and at the end of the discussion. 
Id. at 436 n. 10. see also Gurbe v. Blades, 1:01-cv-357-BLW (Amended Memorandum 
Order, Dkt. 113, 2/6/2006, D.Idaho). 
The opinions of the Court designate the rights listed herein as "structural" 
constitutional rights that are "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction 
can never be treated as harmless error," or as so prone to prejudice, when 
violated, that prejudice already has been proved or should be presumed. Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). 
The protection against prosecuorial suppression of excuplatory evidence 
and other prosecutrial and judical failures to make "material" evidence or 
witnesses available to the defense at trial, when "materiality" is defined as at 
least a 11 'reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result or the proceeding would have been different.'" Kyles, 514 
U.S. at 435 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) in where the court held that evidentiary rulings depriving 
defendant of access to evidence "critical to [his] defense" violates "traditional 
and fundamental standards of due process". Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 
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(1967) holding that violation of Compulsory Process Clause when court arbitrarily 
deprived defendant of "testimony [that] would have been relevant and material, 
and ••• vital to the defense". Tortolano's documentary evidence, Fred Latham's 
Affidavit, includes evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. 
a. The Materiality Of The Withheld Evidence 
The record in this case demonstrates that the respondent, in conjunction 
with the police, suppressed evidentiary information that Tortolano presented 
in his petition. 
When the prosecution made the statement in its opening statement to the jury 
that they would hear Fred Latham's testimony that Mr. Tortolano had told Mr. Latham 
he was planing on killing Penny, it opened the door up for the right to compulsory 
process to confront this witness. The respondent at trial did not produce this 
witness. Yet, twelve jurors heard that Mr. Latham would testify to this and had 
been made to believe it was a true statement until proven otherwise. Mr. Tortolano 
was never given that opportunity 
Further, Mr. Latham's Affidavit also demonstrates that the police were also 
attempting to get Mr. Latham to provide false testimony. (#41552, R., pp.9-1O, 
ff's 4-7, and 9.) Thus, the only issue in the present case is whether there is 
a reasonable probability that the disclosure of the materials would have affected 
the outcome of the proceedings, i.e. whether they are sufficient to shake one's 
confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. 
Other facets of the Brady claim deserve mention. The state attempted to solicit 
perjured testimony from Fred Latham, even though it was not used, and told the 
jury that they would hear him testify that Tortolano told him that he planned on 
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killing Penny. Fred Latham's Affidavit that Tortolano produced as part of his 
petition (#41552, R., pp.8-11) also states that the police attempted to get him 
to lie. Who is to say that the Detectives in this case who did testify at the trial 
told the truth based upon how Detective Anderson attempted to get Latham to lie 
and went so far as to harass him to do so. (#41552, R., p.9, para. 4) and then 
the prosecution as well when they met with Latham in their attempts to get him 
to lie. Id. at para. 6. 
ii. Tortolano Had Demonstrated Evidence To Support An Evidentiary Hearing 
Based upon the evidence that Tortolano presented in the second successive 
petition was sufficient to support the allegations set forth in the petition. 
Tortolano was only required to come forward with some evidence to prove his claims, 
this was the Affidavit from Fred Latham. The district court at the motion to 
dismiss hearing was not permitted to determine credibility issues, nor decide which 
among conflicting pieces of evidence is to be be believed. Here, Tortolano produced 
a Affidavit from Fred Latham to support his claims. Respondent produced nothing 
and only "informed" the court she had to "go back and refresh her recollection" 
as to the events complained of in the second successive petition. (#41552, Tr., 
p.13, Ln.1-5.) Not once did respondent in the district court proceedings in 
the second successive petition file the underlying criminal record and transcripts, 
or portions thereof, in order to set forth an affirmative defense or material 
facts to support her position that Tortolano was not entitled to relief. 
Based upon the genuine issue of material facts that were presented to the 
district court by Tortolano, facts in dispute, required the district court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual issues. Kelly v. State, 
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149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); McKay v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 
225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010); DeRushe' v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 
1152 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007). 
For these reasons this Court should vacate the district courts Order 
granting the respondents motion to dismiss and remand the proceedings back with 
instructions to conduct an evidenitiary hearing to resolve the disputes of 
material issues of fact. 
C. Tortolano was deprived of effective assistance of counsel on collateral 
review of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claim presented 
in the second successive petition for post-conviction relief that was 
contrary to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. 
1. Facts pertaining to argument 
Mr. Tortolano in a second successive petition for post-conviction relief 
had presented a claim that his trial attorney's "failed to challenge the 
prosecutors opening statement asserting that Fred Latham would be called to 
provide incriminatingtestmony(sic), i.e., that the petitioner told Mr. Latham 
taht he was planing on killing Penny." (#41552, R., pp.3-11, 5.) This claim 
was presented as newly discovered evidence, for Tortolano was not aware of the 
facts pertaining to this claim until after he had an opportunity to speak with 
Mr. Latham. (Id. at p.10.) 
Respondent moved to dismiss the second successive petition by filing a motion 
to dismiss in where she made an attempt to boot-strap the claims presented in the 
second successive petition was nothing more than an attempt on Tortolano to the 
first successive petition that was currently pending before the district court. 
(Id. at pp.25-26.) 
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The district court appionted conflict counsel for Tortolano, who then the 
counsel of record in the first successive petition filed a substitution of conflict 
counsel (Id. at pp. 24; 30-31.) counsel of record at no time filed any motions 
to refute the motion to dismiss in the second successive petition that was 
pending before the district court upon respondents motion to dismiss being filed. 
(#41552, R., p.2.) 
2. Why relief should be granted 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[iJn 
all prosectuions, the accused shall enjoy the right ••• to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
"[n]o State shall ••• deprive person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
In this present case Torotolano's post-convcition counsel had not filed any 
pleadings in the matter to defend, or let alone, prove that respondent was not 
permitted the motion to dismiss. Counsel even informd the court that he had "not 
filed anything with regard to these two particular cases", referring to the first 
and second successive petition. (#41552, Tr., p.16, Ln.14-15.) 
In respects to the second successive petition for post-conviction relief, 
upon the respondent having filed the motion to dismiss (#41552, R., pp.25-26) 
that did not contain the underlying criminal record, or portions of it, should 
have filed an objection to respondents motion along with a motion to compel 
respondent to produce the underlying record or portions thereof to support her 
grounds that Tortolano did not produce newly discovered evidence. 
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In the alternative, counsel for Tortolano was required to file a motion to 
take judicial notice of the underlying criminal records and transcripts. Had this 
been done it would have demonstrated to the district court that their was a material 
issue of fact that was in dispute between Tortolano and the respondent and the 
district court could have made a proper determination if the Affidavit of Fred 
Latham was actually newly discovered evidence that would support that Tortolano's 
trial attorney's were in fact ineffective for failing to challenge the 
respondent's opening statement to the jury that Mr. Latham was going to testify 
that Tortolano had planned to kill Penny. This demonstrates the cause and prejudice 
prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Here, Tortolano was required to raise the claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel in the collateral proceeding, that being a post-conviction relief, 
for defendants in a post-conviction proceeding are actually afforded greater 
protection becuase the record can be properly developed regarding trial counsel's 
performance. As explained in State v. Allen, 853 P.2d 625, 627 (Ct.App. 1993): 
Typically, ineffective assistance of comsel claims challenge tre infonmtion 
ca:rm.micated-or not ca:rm.micated-between tre defendant and his trial comsel, 
as well as otrer aspects of tre attorney's performmce, treaties and strategies 
prior to and during trial. Usually, tre trial record does not encanp9SS tre 
facts surrounding such natters so as to allow adequate review of trial 
trial counsel's performmce based solely on tre trial record. 
Additionally, the issue of post-conviction relief counsel being ineffective 
in respects to Tortolano's claim of his trial attorney's ineffectiveness is 
properly set forth herein. This was addressed in Veenstra v. Smith, 2014 WL 1270626 
March 26, 2014 (D.Idaho) B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, where he held that the 
application of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) applies to situations such 
as Tortolano's. Holding that Martinez applies in Idaho where the post-convcition 
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setting was the first forum in which the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim based on matters arising outside the record could have been brought and 
developed in an evidentiary hearing. Id. at *11. 
Further, the Court in Veenstra also held that his claim regarding inefective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel was proper under the standard of review set 
forth in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981), "sufficient reason" 
since his case was decided prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
Murphy v. State, __ P.3d __ , 2014 WL 712695 (2014), review denied, July 1, 2014. 
Veenstra, at *9, fn.3. 
The district court in Tortolano's proceedings were decided prior to Murphy 
and therefore Murphy should not apply to this case, and for the fact that newly 
discovered evidence was presented that supports the claim of trial counsel's 
failure to challenge the prosecutions opening statement to the jury that amounted 
to prosecutorial misconduct. 
a. Trial Counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct 
1. Facts pertaining to argument 
As previously set forth above, Tortolano has set forth newly discovered 
evidence that his attorney's at trial failed to challenge, object, to the 
prosecutions opening statement to the jury that Fred Latham would testify that 
he planned to kill Penny. 
2. Why relief should be granted 
It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, 
that only competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things, he 
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of jurors, and tend 
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to hinder them from considering only evidence introduced. State v. Philips, 144 
Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct.App. 2007). The desire for success should never 
induce the prosecutor to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything 
except the evidence in the case. Id. Opening statements to the jury to gain the 
attention of the jury and to enlighten the jury to what they will witness being 
introduced in the course of the trial and interpret the evidence so as to render 
a fair verdict. 
Importantly, the deception of jurors by the presentation of known false 
evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice. DeMarco v. United 
States, 928 F.2d 1074, 1076 (llthCir. 1991). Thus, the state may not knowingly 
use false evidence, including false testimony not produced, to obtain a conviction. 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 
636 (2000). This standard applies not only to false evidence solicited by the 
prosecution, but also to false evidence that the prosecution allows to go 
uncorrected. Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9thCir. 1991); Sivak, 134 Idaho 
641, 8 P.3d 636. 
In relying on false testimony and misstating the evidence to the jury, the 
prosecutor committed misconduct. Had trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's 
statement, the court would have determined whether the challenged conduct 
constituted misconduct and whether the error was harmless. See State v. Beebe, 
145 Idaho 570, 574, 181 P.3d 496, 500; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 88, 156 P.3d at 589. 
Because trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's misconduct, the trial 
court did not have an opportunity to remedy the conduct's impact with a curative 
instruction and any adverse ruling based on that objection could not be raised 
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on direct appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Tortolano was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to object to the prosecutions opening statement to the jury. It is 
unreasonable for counsel to not object to such a remark as that the prosecution 
made in her opening statement to the jury, or let alone after the state rested 
its case trial counsel could have at least attempted to call that witness, ,Fred 
Latham, that she said would testify that Tortolano had told himheplanned tokill 
Penny, or at the minimum in closing argument pointed out that the prosectuion 
had made a statement of fact that was not true by not producing Mr. Latham to 
testify and demonstrating reasonable doubt based upon such. 
For the reasons set forth above, Tortolano has demonstrated that post-
conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to properly present all matters in 
respect to the newly discovered evidence, most importantly the fact that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutions opening 
statement. As a result Tortolano was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance 
and demostrated that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel in both 
respects to trial counsel's failure to object to the opening statement made by 
the prosecution, and by collateral review counsel being ineffective in failing 
to preserve for further collateral review the matter regarding ineffective-
assistance-of-trial counsel matters regarding the newly discovered evidence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tortolano respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's 
order denying his second post-conviction relief and to remand this case to the 
district court for further consideration in light of reasons set forth above, 
and order that an evidentiary hearing take place to resolve the dispute of material 
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issues of fact. And, grant any further relief that justice may so permit. 
Respectfully submitted OCTOBER __ , 2014. 
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